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Determining Cropland Share
Rental Arrangements
Kevin C. Dhuyvetter, Terry L. Kastens and Joe L. Outlaw *
Many crop producers rely heavily on rented land in their farming operations. The
rental arrangements between landowners and producers can significantly affect risk
and profitability, and producers should understand those effects.
Rental arrangements often seem unresponsive to changes in production practices,
and generally slow to change over time. Producers often work with multiple landown-
ers and may be reluctant to change rental arrangements with any one landowner
unless changes can be made with them all. Rental arrangements also may be slow to
change because land is often rented from the same landowner for an extended time
and the parties involved may feel the costs of renegotiating rental arrangements on a
regular basis outweigh the benefits.
Crop land is typically rented in one of three ways: (1) cash rent; (2) crop share; or
(3) cash/share combination. This publication describes crop share rental arrangements.
For information on cash rental arrangements and land values, see RM 5-12,
Determining Cropland Cash Rental Arrangements.
Determining Crop Shares
Producers often struggle with establishing terms for crop share rental arrange-
ments. Economic theory says that an equilibrium rate occurs where the supply of
land equals the demand for land. How do we arrive at an equilibrium price?
Typically, landowners and tenants negotiate to find a crop share lease arrangement
that is “fair” and equitable to both parties.
An equitable crop share arrangement identifies all contributions made separately
by a landowner and a tenant and then shares any income in this same proportion. In
other words, each party is compensated according to what he or she contributed to
the production process. The underlying assumption of an equitable lease is that
returns to land are similar to the returns to non-land inputs. Thus, the shares going to
each party need to change as relative contributions change, if the lease is to remain
equitable.          
Principles of Crop Share Leases
A good crop share lease should follow five basic principles
(Langemeier): (1) yield-increasing inputs should be shared; 
(2) share arrangements should be adjusted as technology changes;
(3) total returns should be divided in the same proportion as
resources contributed; (4) long-term investments should be com-
pensated when the lease is terminated; and (5) there must be
good communication between landowner and tenant.
While all inputs increase yield (e.g, without seed there is no
yield), principle #1 refers to inputs where yield is a continuous func-
tion of the use of the input. Examples of yield-increasing inputs are fer-
tilizer, irrigation water, possibly herbicides in semi-arid regions, and possibly
hybrid seed. The optimal amount of an input to use is the amount reached when the
value of an additional unit of input equals the cost of supplying an additional unit. In
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economic language, this is referred to as the point
where the value of marginal product (VMP) equals
the marginal input cost (MIC).  
Table 1 shows optimal fertilizer application rates
for alternative cost/income sharing arrangements.
In this example, VMP is greater than MIC at 60
units of fertilizer but less than at 80 units, so total
returns to fertilizer are maximized at 60 units. To
determine the optimal amount of fertilizer a tenant
would apply, VMP and MIC need to be adjusted to
reflect the appropriate percentages. When the cost
of the yield-increasing input is not shared by the
landowner (2/3 inc./all cost column), the tenant has
an economic incentive to under-fertilize and hence
reduce total returns (returns to both landowner
and tenant). Similarly, if the tenant pays none of
the cost (2/3 inc./no cost), he has an incentive to
over- fertilize, which also decreases total returns.
When the cost of fertilizer is shared in the same
proportion as the income (2/3 inc./2/3 cost) the ten-
ant maximizes both his returns and total returns.
Because fertilizer is a relatively low-cost input,
sharing it in the same percent as income may not
be critical. As the cost of the yield-increasing input
increases it becomes more important to share the
cost because the economic incentive for the tenant
to use either too little or too much of the input
becomes greater. Thus, principle #1 helps to pro-
mote optimal production management.
Principle #2 simply states that technologies may
affect share arrangements as they may change the
relative contributions of the parties involved.
Examples of technological changes are reduced
tillage or no-till production, new crops and/or rota-
tions, center pivot irrigation, hybrid seed, bio-tech-
nology, and precision agriculture (GPS).  
A specific example of a technological change is
the increased adoption of the wheat-sorghum-fal-
low rotation in western Kansas. Table 2 shows how
the relative contributions change for the landown-
er and tenant by moving from a wheat-fallow (WF)
to a wheat-sorghum-fallow (WSF) rotation based
on a study conducted at Garden City, Kansas. With
the WF rotation, the equitable crop share arrange-
ment is landowner 1/3 and tenant 2/3, with the ten-
ant paying for all herbicide. However, with the
WSF rotation, if the tenant continues to pay all
herbicide expense, the equitable arrangement
would be a 30 percent/70 percent split. If the tradi-
tional 1/3 / 2/3 crop share is desired, it can be
derived by having the landowner share the
sorghum herbicide expense.
In this example (Table 2), it worked out that the
landowner would need to pay for 1/3 of the
sorghum herbicides in order to maintain the 1/3 /
2/3 crop share arrangement. However, it may be
that paying for some other percentage of the herbi-
cide would be appropriate in other cases. For
example, if herbicide expense on the sorghum
were higher, it may be that the landowner would
only need to pay 1/4 of the sorghum herbicide
costs to maintain a 1/3 / 2/3 equitable split between
total costs and income.
How a lease is structured before the adoption of
a new technology also should be considered.
Table 3 compares the equitable crop share percent-
ages of going from conventional till to no-tillage in
north central Kansas under two different scenar-
ios. In the first scenario, the landowner shares
only fertilizer and the equitable arrangement is
approximately 1/3 / 2/3. In this case, switching to
no-till has little impact on the equitable crop share
percentages because herbicide is essentially a sub-
stitution for tillage. However, if the landowner is
initially sharing all
herbicide and applica-
tion costs (last two
columns), switching to
no-till increases the
equitable share for the
landowner (44 percent
compared to 38 per-
cent), as he is now
contributing a larger
share of total inputs.
WF WSF WSF
Land Landlord Landlord Landlord
Machinery Tenant Tenant Tenant
Fertilizer Shared Shared Shared
Herbicide*
Wheat Tenant Tenant Tenant
Sorghum Tenant Tenant
Other operating Tenant Tenant Tenant
Contributions 33.3/66.7 30.5/69.5 33.1/66.9
*Herbicide expense only; application charge is included in other
operating.
Table 2.
Table 1.
Income and cost position of tenant
Units Yield Income All inc. 2/3 inc. 2/3 inc. 2/3 inc.
/acre (bu.) $2.25/bu. VMP MIC all cost all cost no cost 2/3 cost
0 35 $78.75 $78.75 $52.50 $52.50 $52.50
20 55 $123.75 $45.00 $8.00 $115.75 $74.50 $82.50 $77.17
40 68 $153.00 $29.25 $8.00 $137.00 $86.00 $102.00 $91.33
60 73 $164.25 $11.25 $8.00 $140.25 $85.50 $109.50 $93.50
80 74 $166.50 $2.25 $8.00 $134.50 $79.00 $111.00 $89.67
100 75 $168.75 $2.25 $8.00 $128.75 $72.50 $112.50 $85.83
Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that
the effects of new technologies on
equitable crop share arrangements
will vary because of factors such as
geographic region, specific technology
being adopted, inputs shared initially,
etc. The adoption of a new technolo-
gy may increase, decrease, or have no
effect on the equitable crop share
percentage for either the landowner
or the producer. Therefore, general-
izations about the impact of new
technologies on crop share arrange-
ments are not always possible and
such situations may need to be ana-
lyzed on a case-by-case basis. It is
important that lease arrangements
be flexible enough to accommo-
date changing technologies.
Principle #3 states that total
returns should be divided in the
same proportion as resources con-
tributed, which is basically how a
“fair” and equitable lease is
defined. In order to identify what
is contributed by each party, some
type of budgeting process is
required to account for all costs.
Perhaps the most difficult part of
this process is determining the
annual contributions for capital
assets such as land, machinery or
irrigation equipment.  
The annual land contribution is
typically based on an average mar-
ket value of land times some his-
torical return to land. Machinery
costs can be based on either an
average investment or custom rates
approach. With the investment
approach, annual machinery costs
to include are market (not tax)
depreciation, interest, insurance,
fuel and oil, and labor. The annual
machinery contribution should be
based on average machinery costs
and not on specific costs of the
party providing the machinery. The
reason for this is that producers
should not be penalized for having
below average machinery cost,
which is what would happen using
an individual’s actual costs along
with the contribution approach.
Likewise, a producer who has high
machinery costs because of ineffi-
ciencies or mismanagement should
not benefit from these high costs
Table 3.
*Landlords share of -100% implies input is shared in same porportion as income.
Table 4.
Land and machinery Landlord Annual
ownership costs share* charge Landlord Tenant
Total acres (include fallow) 812 100%
Value of land/acre $650 –
Rate of return 6.0% – $39.00 $39.00 $0.00
Taxes/acre (0.50%) $3.25 – $3.25 $3.25 $0.00
Machinery inv/planted acre $238 0%
Salvage value-percent 35.0%
Depreciation-years 10 – $15.47 $0.00 $15.47
Rate of return 9.0% – $14.46 $0.00 $14.46
Repairs/acre $15.40 0% $14.69 $0.00 $14.69
Management charge 0.0% 25%
Total value of assets $888 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Total ownership cost/leased acre $86.86 $42.25 $44.61
Cash payments between parties (total $) $0 $0 $0
Conventional (CT) vs. no-tillage (NT) effect on equitable shares
(60% wheat, 20% sorghum, 10% soybeans, 10% corn rotation)
Tillage system CT NT CT NT
Contribution Contributor Contributor
Land Landlord Landlord Landlord Landlord
Machinery Tenant Tenant Tenant Tenant
Fertilizer/insecticide Shared Shared Shared Shared
Herbicide and app. Tenant Tenant Shared Shared
Other Tenant Tenant Tenant Tenant
Contributions 32.4/67.6 33.6/66.4 37.6/62.4 43.8/56.2
Table 5.
*Landlords share of -100% implies input is shared in same porportion as income.
Operating costs Landlord Annual
Sorghum share* charge Landlord Tenant
Labor (hrs.) 2.15 0% $23.22 $0.00 $23.22
Seed 0% $3.15 $0.00 $3.15
Herbicide -100% $20.15 $6.72 $13.43
Insecticide -100% $4.35 $1.45 $2.90
Fertilizer -100% $23.10 $7.70 $15.40
Fuel and oil 0% $7.10 $0.00 $7.10
Irrigation energy 0% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Crop consulting 0% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Custom harvest and hauling 0% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Miscellaneous 0% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
_______________ 0% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
_______________ 0% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Interest on operating $3.65 $0.71 $2.93
Total operating cost/acre $84.72 $16.58 $68.13
by getting a higher share of the crop. Table 4
shows an example of how the land and machinery
contributions are considered, where the machinery
costs are based on an average investment per acre.
Production inputs such as seed and herbicide
usually are valued at current values. Table 5 shows
an example of production inputs, where insecticide
and fertilizer are shared equitably (i.e., in the
same proportion as income).
Table 6 shows the total costs provided by both
parties as well as the percentage contributions,
where this percentage represents how income and
equitably shared expenses would be split.
If the objective of a crop share arrangement is
to have a “fair” and equitable lease that compen-
sates both parties according to their relative contri-
butions, then whether certain inputs are shared or
not is not an issue (except as it applies to principle
#1). Rather, what is important is that whoever
pays for the input is compensated accordingly by
adjusting the crop shares when necessary.
If landowners and tenants have preconceptions
about which inputs should be shared, the actual
amounts are then determined by the “fair” process,
which simultaneously selects crop shares. On the
other hand, if there are preconceptions about what
crop shares should be, different items might be
cost shared at different levels to make the “fair”
process happen. In other words, crop share leases
based on this “fair”
and equitable con-
cept can be devel-
oped based on either
a predetermined
share rate (e.g.,
33/67, 40/60, 50/50)
or a predetermined
mixture of shared
inputs (e.g., fertilizer
and insecticide), but
not on both as a gen-
eral rule.
Principle #4 sim-
ply states that if a
tenant pays for any
long-term inputs
(e.g., lime, alfalfa
seed) he or she
should be compensated for any unused portion of
that investment when the lease is terminated. This
would hold true whether the lease is a crop share
or cash lease, and whether the input was paid
entirely by the tenant or shared with the landown-
er.
Principle #5 says that a good lease is based on
good communication between the landowner and
the tenant. Whether the lease is cash rent or crop
share, good communication and trust between the
landowner and producer are more important than
any other factor if the goal is to have a long-term
arrangement that is in the best interest of both
parties. It is especially important that landowners
and tenants maintain good communication as pro-
duction practices change so that rental arrange-
ments can be evaluated and revised as economic
conditions dictate.
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Table 6.
Total costs and contributions
Operating costs per planted acre (excluding labor)
Crop Acres Total Landlord Tenant
Wheat 460 $44.60 $7.69 $36.91
Sorghum 211 $61.51 $16.59 $44.92
Soybean 141 $61.66 $12.72 $48.93
Total for farm 812 $42,190 $8,831 $33,359
Ownership costs (including labor and mgmt.) $87,173 $34,307 $52,866
Cash payments between parties (total $) $0 $0 $0
Total costs (adjusted for cash payment) $129,363 $43,138 $86,225
Operating costs per leased acre $51.96 $10.88 $41.08
Ownership costs per leased acre $107.36 $42.25 $65.11
Total costs per leased acre $159.31 $53.13 $106.19
Percent contributed 100.0% 33.3% 66.7%
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